π—”π—¦π—œπŸ¬πŸ±: π—¨π—»π—²π˜…π—½π—²π—°π˜π—²π—± 𝗖𝗼𝗱𝗲 π—˜π˜…π—²π—°π˜‚π˜π—Άπ—Όπ—» (π—₯π—–π—˜) emerges when untrusted promp…

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π—”π—¦π—œπŸ¬πŸ±: π—¨π—»π—²π˜…π—½π—²π—°π˜π—²π—± 𝗖𝗼𝗱𝗲 π—˜π˜…π—²π—°π˜‚π˜π—Άπ—Όπ—» (π—₯π—–π—˜) emerges when untrusted prompts, files, tool responses or generated content cross the boundary into a shell, interpreter, build pipeline or runtime. Once that boundary disappears, a prompt-injection problem can become system compromise.

Defensive priorities:

Where does generated content cross into execution in your architecture?

#AgenticAI #RCE #ApplicationSecurity #Sandboxing #AISecurity #OWASP #SecureByDesign unexpected code execution, RCE, sandboxing, code interpreter, command injection, unsafe deserialization, model output validation, egress control, OWASP ASI05