ππ¦ππ¬π±: π¨π»π²π π½π²π°ππ²π± ππΌπ±π² ππ π²π°πππΆπΌπ» (π₯ππ) emerges when untrusted prompts, files, tool responses or generated content cross the boundary into a shell, interpreter, build pipeline or runtime. Once that boundary disappears, a prompt-injection problem can become system compromise.
Defensive priorities:
- Treat all model output as untrusted data
- Never pass free-form output directly to a shell or interpreter
- Use strict schemas and allowlisted operations
- Execute in isolated, ephemeral sandboxes
- Deny unnecessary network egress
- Require approval for high-impact execution
Where does generated content cross into execution in your architecture?
#AgenticAI #RCE #ApplicationSecurity #Sandboxing #AISecurity #OWASP #SecureByDesign unexpected code execution, RCE, sandboxing, code interpreter, command injection, unsafe deserialization, model output validation, egress control, OWASP ASI05