What if your AI agent performs every step correctly but someone has quietly changed the destination?
That is the danger behind ๐๐ฆ๐๐ฌ๐ญ: ๐๐ด๐ฒ๐ป๐ ๐๐ผ๐ฎ๐น ๐๐ถ๐ท๐ฎ๐ฐ๐ธ.
An agent can be redirected through a malicious document, poisoned web page, deceptive tool output or forged message. The workflow may still look normal. The tools may still be approved. But the agent is now solving the attackerโs problem instead of yours.
This is why securing an agent cannot stop at filtering the first prompt. We need to continuously validate:
- What was the original human intent?
- Has the goal changed during execution?
- Does the next action still belong to the approved task?
- Should a human confirm this decision?
The important lesson: ๐ฎ ๐๐ฎ๐ณ๐ฒ ๐ท๐ผ๐๐ฟ๐ป๐ฒ๐ ๐ถ๐ ๐บ๐ฒ๐ฎ๐ป๐ถ๐ป๐ด๐น๐ฒ๐๐ ๐ถ๐ณ ๐ฎ๐ป ๐ฎ๐๐๐ฎ๐ฐ๐ธ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ฐ๐ฎ๐ป ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐น๐ฎ๐ฐ๐ฒ ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐ฑ๐ฒ๐๐๐ถ๐ป๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป.
Official resource: https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/
How are you detecting goal drift in your agentic workflows?
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